

9 October 1964

TALKING NOTES FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Service Parochial Interests as Revealed by Dissents  
to NIE's

1. Air Force, the chief dissenter, has held to a number of positions in the NIE 11-8-series contrary to those accepted by rest of community for several years. Air Force views can be specifically related to Air Force budget as follows:

- a. Higher ICBM estimates (NIE 11-8 series) -- requirement for large US ICBM force to counter Soviet threat.
- b. More undetected ICBM launchers -- requirement for strike/peace manned aircraft.
- c. Higher bomber estimates, including follow-on heavy bomber -- requirement for a large air defense establishment, and support for larger US bomber force with the "new" bombers.
- d. Soviet capability to put more bombers over North America -- same as c.

USAF review(s) completed.

ARMY review(s) completed.

2. Air Force, in addition, has taken dissents on subjects which directly affect budgets of other services, classic case was Air Force re-write of Conclusions of NIE 11-14-62 which;

- a. Downgraded possibility on non-nuclear limited war between nuclear powers (and hence the need to prepare for it).
- b. Downgraded prospect of large-scale theater operations in a general war.
- c. Upgraded Soviet tactical aviation, making this a more difficult threat to counter.
- d. Air Force has also upgraded Soviet ASW capabilities (as in NIE 11-4-61) with obvious implications for Polaris.

3. Army and Navy have relatively clean records; most of their dissents represent honest differences, e.g., Navy's dissents on fissionable materials production in NIE 11-2 series.

- a. However, Army has tended to upgrade Soviet ASM capabilities -- probably to create more demand for NINE ZEUS.

4. Army, Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations joined in one classic footnote to SHIE 11-9-61, dissenting from the judgment that the evidence did not justify the conclusion that the Soviets had engaged in clandestine nuclear tests during the moratorium. They held that there was a "strong possibility."

a. In this case, these service representatives agreed on the strategy to be used in the representatives meeting, which was to weaken the text as much as possible, and then footnote.

b. AEC also dissented on this one.

SHERMAN KENT  
AD/NE

9 October 1964

Notes on Service Dissents to NIE's

1. Air Force, the chief dissenter, has held to a number of positions in the NIE 11-8 series contrary to those accepted by rest of community for several years. Air Force views can be specifically related to Air Force budget as follows:

- (a) Higher ICBM estimates (NIE 11-8 series) -- requirement for large US ICBM force to counter Soviet threat.
- (b) More undetected ICBM launcher -- requirement for strike/rece manned aircraft.
- (c) Higher bomber estimates, including follow-on heavy bomber -- requirement for a large air defense establishment.
- (d) Soviet capability to put more bombers over North America -- same as (c).

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- (b) Downgraded prospect of large-scale theater operations in a general war.
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3. Army and Navy have relatively clean records; most of their dissents represent honest differences, e.g., Navy's dissents on fissionable materials production in NIE 11-2 series.

- (a) However, Army has tended to upgrade Soviet AMM capabilities -- probably to create more demand for NIKE ZEUS.

4. Army, Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations joined in one classic footnote to SNIE 11-9-61, dissenting from the judgment that the evidence did not justify the conclusion that the Soviets had engaged in clandestine nuclear tests during the moratorium. They held that there was a "strong possibility."

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